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Abstract.
The two important qualities of a cipher is security and speed. Frequently,
to satisfy the security of a Boolean function primitive, speed may be
traded-off. In this paper we present a general construction that addresses
both qualities. The idea of our construction is to manipulate a crypto-
graphically strong base function and one of its affine equivalent functions,
using concatenation and negation. We achieve security from the inher-
ent qualities of the base function, which are preserved (or increased) and
obtain speed by the simple Boolean operations. We present two applica-
tions of the construction to demonstrate the flexibility and efficiency of
the construction.
Keywords: Cryptographic Boolean functions, avalanche characteristics, re-
siliency, algebraic immunity, nonlinearity, hidden weighted bit function.
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1 Introduction
A stream cipher typically employs at least one Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) to generate a secret key stream. Due to the linear nature of LFSR, the
raw bits from LFSRs can not be used to encrypt a message, since the encrypted
message is vulnerable to linear cryptanalysis and other forms of attacks. There-
fore, the stream cipher filters an LFSR or combines multiple LFSRs to generate
stronger secret key stream bits, via a Boolean function as a nonlinear filter or
combiner, respectively. Two key factors in designing cryptographic Boolean func-
tions are security and speed. We achieve security by having good measures in as
many cryptographic properties as possible for the Boolean function in a cipher,
such as balancedness to resist statistical attacks, high nonlinearity to address
linear cryptanalysis on block ciphers (or correlation attacks on stream ciphers),
high algebraic degree against algebraic attacks (although, this is not sufficient),
high correlation immunity and resilience to deal with correlation attacks, and
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high algebraic immunity to resist (fast) algebraic attacks. Speed is another im-
portant aspect in a cipher, since we desire fast encryption and decryption. For
example, the Carlet-Feng function has good cryptographic properties, but it is
not simple to generate, which may affect certain ciphers to underperform. Here
we present some ideas to construct good cryptographic Boolean functions using
a cryptographically strong base function, and three simple Boolean operations,
namely concatenation, affine transformation, and negation. One of the significant
benefits from this construction is the flexibility to choose an appropriate base
function with known cryptographic properties (and we propose several such).
This means we can customize our function, focusing on certain cryptographic
properties. The other benefit is that our function is easy to construct due to the
three previously mentioned basic operations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the necessary background
is established. We then present a construction of functions based on concate-
nation, affine transformation, and negation in Section 3. In Section 4, we give
applications for our construction.
2 Preliminaries
Let Fn2 be the n-dimensional vector space over the binary field F2, and Bn the
set of all n-variable Boolean functions defined on Fn2 .
Any Boolean function f ∈ Bn can be uniquely represented as a multivariate
polynomial in F2[x1, . . . , xn], called the algebraic normal form (ANF),







The algebraic degree of f , denoted by deg(f), is the number of variables in the
highest order term with nonzero coefficients.
A Boolean function is affine if there exists no term of degree strictly greater
than 1 in the ANF and the set of all affine functions is denoted by An. Let f ∈ Bn
and E be any flat (that is, a coset of a vector subspace). If the restriction f |E of
f to E is constant (respectively affine), then E is called a constant (respectively
affine) flat for f .
Let
1f = {x ∈ Fn2 |f(x) = 1}, 0f = {x ∈ Fn2 |f(x) = 0},
be the support of a Boolean function f , respectively, its complement. The car-
dinality of 1f is called the Hamming weight of f , and will be denoted by wt(f).
The Hamming distance between two functions f and g is the Hamming weight of
f+g, and will be denoted by d(f, g). We say that an n-variable Boolean function
f is balanced if wt(f) = 2n−1.





The nonlinearity of an n-variable Boolean function is bounded above by 2n−1−
2n/2−1, and a function is said to be bent if it achieves this bound. Clearly, bent
functions exist only for even n and it is known that the algebraic degree of a
bent function is bounded above by n2 [13].
A Boolean function f ∈ Bn is called k-normal (respectively k-weakly-normal)
if there exist a k-dimensional constant (respectively affine) flat for f . If k = dn2 e,
f is simply called a normal (respectively weakly-normal) function.
For any f ∈ Bn, a nonzero function g ∈ Bn is called an annihilator of f if
fg is null, and the algebraic immunity of f , denoted by AI(f), is the minimum
value of d such that f or f+1 admits an annihilator of degree d [25]. It is known
that the algebraic immunity of an n-variable Boolean function is bounded above
by dn2 e [12].
To resist algebraic attacks, a Boolean function f should have a high algebraic
immunity, which implies that the nonlinearity of f is also not very low, since,









To resist fast algebraic attacks, a high algebraic immunity is not sufficient. If
we can find g of low degree and h of algebraic degree not much larger than n/2
such that fg = h, then f is considered to be weak against fast algebraic attacks
[11, 17]. The higher order nonlinearities of functions with high (fast) algebraic
immunity is also not very low [6, 26, 37].
The Walsh transform of a given function f ∈ Bn is the integer-valued function





where u ∈ Fn2 and u · x is an inner product, for instance, u · x = u1x1 +
u2x3 + · · · + unxn, where u = (u1, . . . , un),x = (x1, . . . , xn). A function f is
said to be resilient of order r if Wf (u) = 0, for 0 ≤ wt(u) ≤ r. It is easy to see
that a Boolean function f is balanced if and only if Wf (0) = 0. Moreover, the
nonlinearity of f can be determined by










Also, f satisfies the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) if Cf (a) = 0, for wt(a) = 1.
We say that f, g ∈ Bn are affine equivalent if there exists an n× n invertible
matrix A over the finite field F2 and vectors b, c ∈ Fn2 such that g(x) = f(Ax+
b)+c ·x. If f is a Boolean function in n variables and H is a flat (a coset of some
vector subspace) in Fn2 , we let f |H to be the (restriction) function f |H : H → F2
by f |H(x) = f(x), for x ∈ H.
3 The construction and its cryptographic properties
We next introduce a construction based on balanced functions fi ∈ Bn−2, i = 1, 2
(|| denotes concatenation).
Construction 1. For {i, j} = {1, 2}, we define the functions f on Fn2 :
f = fi||fj ||fi||f¯j = xn−1xn + xn−1(fi + fj) + fi,
which is affine equivalent to fi||fj ||f¯i||fj ; fi||f¯j ||fi||fj ; f¯i||fj ||fi||fj ;
f = fi||fj ||fj ||f¯i = xn−1xn + xn−1(fi + fj) + xn(fi + fj) + fi,
which is affine equivalent to fi||fj ||f¯j ||fi; fi||f¯j ||fj ||fi; f¯i||fj ||fj ||fi.
We could have defined f = fi||fj ||f¯i||f¯j = xn−1(fi+fj)+xn+fi to also fulfil
resiliency, but, unfortunately, a few of the other properties get slightly weaker.
Some of the cryptographic properties, like algebraic immunity, or strict avalanche
criterion are not (fully) affine invariants, so we prefer to list all concatenations
for completeness, but we shall prove our results motivating whenever necessary,
the relevant differences between the various classes of functions.
Variations of this construction have appeared in literature and some of their
properties have been investigated. Most notably, bent, resiliency and the nor-
mality properties of a concatenation (based upon bent functions) were looked
at in [5, 8, ?], and the normality of f1||f2||f2||f¯1 for arbitrary fi with i = 1, 2
is addressed in [16] (see also [29] for other properties). We will also prove the
normality result later on for all these classes. We mention also the paper of
Pasalic [27], which introduces the notion of high degree product (HDP) to mea-
sure the ability of Boolean functions to be resistant to fast algebraic attacks:
f ∈ Bn satisfies the HDP of order n if for any non-annihilating function g of
degree e with 1 ≤ e ≤ dn/2e − 1, the degree d = deg(gf) satisfies e + d ≥ n.
Unfortunately, the construction of [27] based upon a four function concatenation
does not always produce almost optimal HDP functions, and this was observed
in [39].
We next generalize a known lemma that relates the Walsh–Hadamard coef-
ficients of g (in some dimension) to the Walsh–Hadamard coefficients of its 2r
(r ≥ 1) concatenation parts.





Wg(u, un+1, . . . , un+r)





where r ∈ N, a(k) is the kth lexicographically ordered vector in Fr2, and u′ =
(un+1, . . . , un+r).












= Wg1(u) + (−1)un+1Wg2(u).









where g′ = f2r+1(x)‖f2r+2(x)‖ · · · ‖f2r+1(x), we have
Wg′′(u, un+1, . . . , un+r+1)
= Wg(u, un+1, . . . , un+r) + (−1)un+r+1Wg′(u, un+1, . . . , un+r)





which shows our claim. uunionsq
Lemma 2 (Proposition 1 of [7]) Let g1, g2 be two Boolean functions in the
variables x1, . . . , xn with AI(g1) = d1,AI(g2) = d2, and let g = (1 + xn+1)g1 +
xn+1g2 ∈ Bn+1. Then, the following hold:
1. If d1 6= d2, then AI(g) = min{d1, d2}+ 1.
2. If d1 = d2(=: d), then d ≤ AI(g) ≤ d + 1. Further, AI(g) = d if and only
if there exists f1, f2 ∈ Bn of algebraic degrees d that either both annihilate
g1, g2, or both annihilate g¯1, g¯2, and deg(f1 + f2) ≤ d− 1.
For our next result, we let f1 ∈ Bn−2 in Construction 1 be any balanced
function and f2(x) = f1(Ax + b), where A is an (n − 2) by (n − 2) invertible
matrix over the finite field F2 and b is an (n − 2) dimensional vector over F2.
Clearly, f1 and f2 are affine equivalent, deg(f1) = deg(f2), AI(f1) = AI(f2)
and nl(f1) = nl(f2).
Theorem 3 Let f be given by Construction 1, with f1, f2 nonconstant and
affine equivalent. Then f is balanced, deg(f) = max{deg(f1),deg(f1 + f2) +
1}, AI(f1) + 2 ≥AI(f) ≥ min{AI(f1||f2),AI(f1||f¯2)} ≥ AI(f1). Moreover,
nl(f) = 2n−2 + 2nl(f1).
Proof. We take f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2 as an example (the other cases equivalent
to this one in Construction 1 are similar). Clearly, deg(f) = deg(f1||f2) =
max{deg(f1),deg(f1 + f2) + 1}. Since f1||f2 is affine equivalent to f1||f¯2 (pre-
cisely, (f1||f¯2)(x) = (f1||f2)(x) + xn) we have |AI(f1||f2)−AI(f1||f¯2)| ≤ 1 (by
[7, Lemma 1]). If AI(f1||f2) = AI(f1||f¯2), by Lemma 2, AI(f) ≥ AI(f1||f2) ≥
AI(f1). If |AI(f1||f2) − AI(f1||f¯2)| = 1, then Lemma 2 shows that AI(f) =
min{d, d+ 1}+ 1 = d+ 1, where min{AI(f1||f2),AI(f1||f¯2)} = d.
If f = f1||f2||f2||f¯1 (the other cases equivalent to this one in Construction 1
are similar), then deg(f) = max{deg(f1||f2),deg((f1 + f¯2)||(f2 + f¯1)) + 1}, and
since deg((f1 + f¯2)||(f2 + f¯1)) = max{deg(f1 + f¯2),deg(f1 + f¯2 + f2 + f¯1) +
1} = max{deg(f1 + f¯2), 1} ≤ deg(f1), we get that deg(f) = deg(f1||f2) =
max{deg(f1),deg(f1 + f2) + 1}, in this case, as well. The algebraic immunity
computation does not change in this case.
To find the nonlinearity, we first consider f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2 of Construction 1
(the others are similar). Using Lemma 1, we obtain
Wf (u, un−1, un) = Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1Wf2(u)
+(−1)unWf1(u) + (−1)un−1+unWf¯2(u)
= (1 + (−1)un)Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1 (1− (−1)un)Wf2(u).




|Wf (u, un−1, un)| = 2 max
u∈Fn−22
|Wf1(u)| = 2n−1 − 4nl(f1)).
Therefore, nl(f) = 2n−2 + 2nl(f1). uunionsq
Remark 4 In most cases, deg(f1(Ax + b) + f1) = deg(f1). That is, deg(f) =
deg(f1)+1. As can be seen from Proposition 1 of [7], in many cases, AI(f1||f2) =
AI(f1)+1, and so, AI(f) ≥ AI(f1)+1. Further, nl(f) is obviously higher than




























that is, the bias of f is half of the bias of f1.
Remark 5 Using Proposition 1 of [27], we infer that if one takes f1, f2 ∈ Bn
(n even) of maximum AI, with the property that for any function g of algebraic
degree 1 ≤ e ≤ dn/2e − 1, we have deg(f1g) = d ≥ AI(f1) and e + d ≥ n,
then f = f1||f2||f¯1||f2 has maximum AI. Such functions f1 are called perfect
algebraic immune (PAI). The authors of [22] showed (in their Theorem 7) that
if f1 is a balanced PAI then n = 2k + 1, for some k; if f1 is unbalanced, then
n = 2k, for some k.
Next, we are concerned with normality issues of our construction. References [8,
16] contain secondary constructions of normal, or non-normal functions based
upon some of the functions of Construction 1, namely f1||f2||f2||f¯1, where fi are
bent or have some normality properties.
Theorem 6 Let fi, fj ∈ Bn−2. If fi or fj, whichever is not complemented in
Construction 1, is k-normal, then the functions f of Construction 1 are at least
(k + 1)-normal.
Proof. Due to the affine equivalence to fi, fj is k-normal. If fi is invariant, say
0 on a k-dimensional flat, then f¯i is constant and equal to 1 on the same flat,
which shows that f¯i is k-normal. We prove the case f = fi‖fj‖fi‖f¯j only, since
other cases can be shown by similar arguments. We show the existence of a
(k + 1)-dimensional affine subspace where f(x) is a constant. Let z1, . . . zk ∈
be k distinct, linearly independent vectors in Fn−22 , d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn−2) be a
vector in Fn−22 , and ai ∈ F2 be for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define a k-dimensional flat
G = {x ∈ Fn−22 | x = a1z1 +a2z2 + · · ·+akzk +d, ai = F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k} such that
fi|G = 0. We now construct a (k + 1)-dimensional flat in the following way. Let
zl = (zl1, zl2, . . . , zl(n−2)) where 1 ≤ l ≤ k. We set z′l = (zl1, zl2, . . . , zl(n−2), 0, 0),
z′k+1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1), and d
′ = (d1, d2, . . . , dn−2, 0, 0) where z′k+1, d
′ ∈ Fn2 . Then
G′ = {x′ ∈ Fn2 | x′ = a1z′1 +a2z′2 + · · ·+ak+1z′k+1 +d′, ai = F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k+1}. If
a vector x′ ∈ G′ with ak+1 = 0, then f equals the first fi in the construction. If
a vector x′ ∈ G′ with ak+1 = 1, then f has the same value as the third fi in the
construction. Therefore, G′ is a (k+ 1)-dimensional flat such that f |G′ = 0. uunionsq
Generally, it is difficult to establish a proper limit to the normality of a
function. Let fi or fj , whichever is not complemented in Construction 1, be k-
normal but not (k+1)-normal, and we show that the function f of Construction 1
cannot have a constant function value on the k+2-dimensional flat H = {a1ei1⊕
· · · ⊕ ak+2eik+2 ⊕ d}, where d = (y1, . . . yn) is a fixed vector in Fn2 and eim =
(x1, . . . , xn) is an elementary vector such that xj = 1 if and only if j = im with
1 ≤ im ≤ n. We assume f = fi‖fj‖fi‖f¯j , since the other cases can be shown by
similar arguments. Let us also assume that H exists such that f |H is constant.
We observe that yim is irrelevant (whether it is 0 or 1) due to eim , so we set d
with yi1 = . . . = yik+2 = 0. To illustrate better, we rewrite the restriction of our
function to H as follows:
f(x)|H = (x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj)‖(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1f¯j) |H
= x¯n(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj)⊕ xn(x¯n−1fi ⊕ xn−1f¯j) |H
= x¯n−1(x¯nfi ⊕ xnfi)⊕ xn−1(x¯nfj ⊕ xnf¯j) |H
= fi ⊕ xn−1fi ⊕ xn−1fj ⊕ xn−1xn |H .
Without loss of generality, we assume f(x) = 0 for all x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ H,
and we examine the following cases, depending upon the values of xn−1 and xn.
Case 1: n − 1, n /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then xn−1 = dn−1, and dn = xn. We
observe that for all possible values for xn−1 and xn, f |H is one of the functions,
fi, fj , or f¯j . Since each function is only k-normal, there exists at least one x ∈H
such that f(x)|H = 1, which is a contradiction.
Case 2: n− 1 /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2} and xn ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then xn−1 = dn−1.
If xn−1 = 0, then regardless of the value of xn, f |H equals the function fi. We
note that we can only increase the normality to k + 1 using xn, since fi is k-
normal. Therefore, there exists at least one x ∈H such that f(x)|H = 1, which
is a contradiction. If xn−1 = 1, f |H equals the function fj with xn = 0 or f¯j
with xn = 1. Clearly, f |H is at most k-normal, since f¯j = fj⊕1. So, there exists
at least one x ∈H such that f(x)|H = 1, which is a contradiction.
Case 3: n /∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2} and xn−1 ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. Then dn = xn. If
xn = 0, then f |H equals the function, fi‖fj . Also, if xn = 1, then f |H equals the
function fi‖f¯j . In both instances, we can only increase the normality to k + 1,
since fi, fj and f¯j are k-normal.
Case 4: xn−1, xn ∈ {i1, i2, . . . , ik+2}. In this case f |H equals fi‖fj‖fi‖f¯j |H ,
and any two vectors x′, x′′ ∈ H in the forms of x′ = (a1, . . . , an−2, 1, 0) and
x′′ = (b1, . . . , bn−2, 1, 1) with ai, bi ∈ F2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 have opposite function
values. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
Under what conditions the functions of Construction 1 is exactly (k + 2)-
normal remains an open problem.
Theorem 7 If the base functions f1 and f2 in Construction 1 satisfy the strict
avalanche criterion, then f satisfies the strict avalanche criterion.
Proof. For every vector y ∈ Fn2 , write y = (y′, yn−1, yn) with y′ ∈ Fn−22 . We
shall show the claim in the case f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2, as all the other possibilities
are similar. Let a ∈ Fn2 of weight wt(a) = 1. We consider three cases.
Case 1. Take a = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Then
f(x) + f(x+ a) = (f1||f2)(x′, xn−1)x¯n + (f1||f¯2)(x′, xn−1)xn
+(f1||f2)(x′, xn−1)xn + (f1||f¯2)(x′, xn−1)x¯n
= (f1||f2)(x′, xn−1) + (f1||f¯2)(x′, xn−1) = 02n−1 ||12n−1 ,
hence balanced.
Case 2. Take a = (0, . . . , 1, 0). Then
f(x) + f(x+ a)
= (f1||f2)(x′, x¯n−1)x¯n + (f1||f¯2)(x′, x¯n−1)xn
+(f1||f2)(x′, xn−1)x¯n + (f1||f¯2)(x′, xn−1)xn
= f1(x
′)xn−1x¯n + f2(x′)x¯n−1x¯n + f1(x′)xn−1xn + f¯2(x′)x¯n−1xn
+f1(x
′)x¯n−1x¯n + f2(x′)xn−1x¯n + f1(x′)x¯n−1xn + f¯2(x′)xn−1xn
= f1(x
′)x¯n + f2(x′)x¯n + f1(x′)xn + f¯2(x′)xn = f1(x′) + f2(x′) + xn,
which is balanced (regardless of whether f1 + f2 is balanced).
Case 3. Take a = (a′, 0, 0), with wt(a′) = 1. Write x′ + a′ = x′′. Then,
f(x) + f(x+ a)
= (f1||f2)(x′, xn−1)x¯n + (f1||f¯2)(x′, xn−1)xn
+(f1||f2)(x′′, xn−1)x¯n + (f1||f¯2)(x′′, xn−1)xn
= f1(x
′)x¯n−1x¯n + f2(x′)xn−1x¯n + f1(x′)x¯n−1xn + f¯2(x′)xn−1xn
+f1(x
′′)x¯n−1x¯n + f2(x′′)xn−1x¯n + f1(x′′)x¯n−1xn + f¯2(x′′)xn−1xn
= (f1(x
′) + f1(x′′))x¯n−1x¯n + (f2(x′) + f2(x′′))xn−1x¯n
+(f1(x
′) + f1(x′′))x¯n−1xn + (f¯2(x′) + f¯2(x′′))xn−1xn
= (f1(x
′) + f1(x′′))x¯n−1 + (f2(x′) + f2(x′′))xn−1,
which is balanced, since f1, f2 satisfy the strict avalanche criterion, and so, both
f1(x
′) + f1(x′ + a′) and f2(x′) + f2(x′ + a′) are balanced.
4 Two particular cases, based on the HWBF and
Carlet-Feng function
In 2002, Krause [18] introduced another attack using Binary Decision Diagram
(BDD). Later research [19, 33] showed the effectiveness of BDD-based attacks
on stream ciphers (albeit, they generally require a large amount of memory).
Krause notes that one of the effective ways to disrupt BDD-based attacks is for
the Boolean function combiner of the stream cipher is to have a robust BDD.
There are many constructions of Boolean functions with high algebraic immu-
nity [1, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 20, 21, 28, 30–32, 34–36, 38, 40]. However, none of these pa-
pers (except for [38]) took BDD-based attacks into consideration. Interestingly,
Bryant (see [2, 3]) showed that the Hidden Weighted Bit Function (HWBF) has
exponential size BDD.
Below, we give more exact results on the cryptographic properties of functions
in our construction if the base functions are variations of the hidden weighted
bit function (HWBF), which is defined by
hn(x) =
{
0 if x = 0
xwt(x) otherwise.
It is known [38] that hn ∈ Bn is balanced, with the optimum algebraic degree,





braic immunity AI(hn) ≥ bn3 c+ 1.
Let φ be the left-rotation symmetric operation on vectors of arbitrary di-
mension, say φ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (x2, . . . , xn, x1). It was shown previously in
[38] that the hidden weighted bit (HWBF) function is a concatenation which
can be iterated (write x = (x2, . . . , xn−2) ∈ Fn−32 ), as shown in the next formula
hn(x1,x, xn−1, xn) = hn−1(x1,x, xn−1)||(hn−1 ◦ φ)(x1,x, xn−1)
= hn−2(x1,x)||(hn−2 ◦ φ)(x1,x)||hn−2(x, xn−1)||(hn−2 ◦ φ)(x, xn−1) · · · .
(1)
Theorem 8 Let n ≥ 3 and f1||f2 = hn−1 be an (n−1)–variables HWBF. Then,
all of the functions f from Construction 1 are balanced of degree max{n− 2, 2},
have nonlinearity nl(f) = 2n−1 − 4( n−4d(n−4)/2e), and have algebraic immunity
≥ ⌊n+23 ⌋.
Proof. Certainly, all functions in Construction 1 are balanced. Furthermore, for
any concatenation g1||g2, the degree deg(g1||g2) = max{deg(g1),deg(g1+g2)+1}.
Thus, since deg(f1||f2) = deg(hn−1) = n− 2, we obtain
deg(f1||f2||f1||f¯2) = max{deg(f1||f2),deg((f1||f2) + (f1||f¯2)) + 1}
= max{n− 2,deg(02n−212n−2) + 1}
= max{n− 2, 2}
(we write 0s, or 1s, for the corresponding bit repeated s times).
Next, we will do the computation for only one case, say f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2.
We will show that max
w∈Fn+22






Using Lemma 1, with g1 = hn−1 = f1||f2, g2 = f1||f¯2, f1 = hn−2, and
f2 = hn−2 ◦ φ, as in the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain
Wf (u, un−1, un) = (1 + (−1)un)Wf1(u) + (−1)un−1 (1− (−1)un)Wf2(u).
Thus, Wf (u, un−1, 0) = 2Wf1(u) and Wf (u, un−1, 1) = 2(−1)un−1Wf2(u). Since























We obtain that the nonlinearity of the functions in Construction 1 is nl(f) =
2n−1 − 4( n−4dn−42 e).
We now deal with the computation of the algebraic immunity for the consid-





+ 1. We observe that
h′n(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = hn(x2, x3, . . . , xn, x1), and certainly AI(hn) = AI(h′n). By
the definition of algebraic immunity, we observe that AI(g) = AI(g) for any
Boolean function g, and also, that AI(fi||fj) = AI(fj ||fi), and AI(fi||f¯j) =
AI(f¯i||fj), i = 1, 2. So without loss of generality, we will only consider the case
of f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2.
Let g = g1||g2||k1||k2 6= 0 be an annihilator of f . Thus, g1, k1 are both
annihilators of f1; and, g2, respectively, k2 are annihilators of f2, respectively,
f¯2, not all zero.
First, since g1||g2 is an annihilator of f1||f2 = hn−1, it follows that deg(g1||g2) =
0, if both g1 = g2 = 0, or deg(g1||g2) ≥ dn−1. Also, observe that deg(g1 + k1) is
Table 1. Algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of the HWBF-based f and the HWBF h
n AI(f) AI(h) nl(f) nl(h)
7 3 3 52 44
8 4 4 104 88
9 4 4 216 186
10 5 4 432 372
11 5 5 884 772
12 5 5 1768 1544
13 6 5 3592 3172
14 6 5 7184 6344
15 6 6 14536 12952
Table 2. Behavior of the HWBF-based function f against Fast Algebraic Attacks
n 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
(d, e) (1,3) (1,5) (1,5) (1,7) (1,7) (1,9) (1,9)
(2,4) (2,4) (2,4) (2,5) (2,6) (2,8) (2,8)
(3,3) (3,4) (3,4) (3,5) (3,5) (3,6) (3,6)
(4,5) (4,5) (4,6) (4,6)
(5,6)
either 0, if g1 = k1, or ≥ dn−1 (since g1 + k1 is an annihilator of f1). Now, the
degree of the concatenation g = g1||g2||k1||k2 is
deg(g) = max{deg(g1||g2),deg((g1 + k1)||(g2 + k2)) + 1}.
Next, deg(g1||g2) = max{deg(g1),deg(g1+g2)+1}, and deg((g1+k1)||(g2+k2)) =
max{deg(g1 + k1),deg(g1 + g2 + k1 + k2) + 1}.
It is rather obvious that the worst case is when g1 = k1, g2 = k¯2. Then,










, which proves the first
claims. uunionsq
Let f = f1||f2||f1||f¯2 with f1f2 = hn−1, the HWBF. In Table 1, one can find
the algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of f , compared to the same parameters
for the HWBF h. Let fg = h, deg(g) = d and deg(h) = e. In Table 2, we give
the lowest possible values of (d, e), as needed for the fast algebraic attack.
There are other cases where our construction is quite strong, improving upon
the parameters of other existing constructions. Let CF ∈ Bn be the Carlet–Feng
function whose support is {0, 1, α, . . . , α2n−1−2}, where α is a primitive element
of the field F2n . We now consider our construction with the base functions that
are variations of CF , and give some experimental results.
Let f1 ∈ B10 be the Carlet–Feng function with the primitive polynomial
x10 + x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
Table 3. Algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of the CF -based function f and the
function TCT introduced by [35]
n AI(f) AI(TCT ) nl(f) nl(TCT )
8 4 4 112 108
10 5 5 480 476
12 6 6 1992 1982
14 7 7 8076 8028
16 8 8 32532 32508
and f2(x) = f1(Ax), where
A = (e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e10, e6, e7, e8, e9)
and ei ∈ F102 is the unit column vector with 1 on the i-th position. Let f =
f1||f2||f1||f¯2 ∈ B12. Then AI(f) = 6 and nl(f) = 1992. The nonlinearity of
the 12-variable Carlet-Feng function discussed by [35, 36] is only 1970. Also,
the balanced function TCT : F2k × F2k → F2 constructed by [35] which is
based on the Carlet–Feng function has the nonlinearity 1982, when 2k = 12.
Clearly, our function f has optimum algebraic immunity and the nonlinearity
of our function is also higher than the ones mentioned, in addition to satisfying
other cryptographic properties. Let f1 ∈ Bn−2 be the Carlet–Feng function and
f2(x) = f1(Ax). For n = 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, in Table 3, we give the algebraic im-
munity and nonlinearity of f , compared to the same parameters for the function
TCT introduced by [35].
As it was also motivated in [38] for the HWBF, for the same number of vari-
ables, the algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of our construction may be lower
than the ones of the Carlet-Feng function. However, since our functions can be
implemented very efficiently in hardware (LFRSs are better suited for hardware),
we can use more variables, thus increasing the cryptographic properties of the
combiner.
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